GHO

A collateral price crash triggers Aave liquidations for GHO, forcing the sale of collateral within the protocol's defined limits. Before the shock, collateral coverage stood at 1.27; after the shock, it rose to 1.80 as the mechanism restored 0.53 in coverage. The forced sales volume totaled $7.3M against exit liquidity of $23.0M, resulting in a ratio of 31.7%. Bad debt reached $7.3M, representing 1.0% of supply.

The binding side for liquidation capacity is the collateral that can be sold, which limits recovery minting rather than the act of liquidation itself. Facilitator buckets hold up to $50.0M each, while one facilitator holds $45.0M and another holds $135.0M. The GSMs remain active exit venues in a collateral crash scenario, even if their freeze status is pending.

GHO liquidators can source up to $286.3M within the liquidation bonus, with the GSMs providing an additional $285.5M of mint headroom. No liquidity providers leave in this scenario, and the exit-exhausted cells indicate that forced sales are bounded by the available sell-side capacity rather than a lack of buyers.

A depeg of the paired stablecoin, USDT at its middle target, triggers forced sales in the Member-2 headline scenario. The mechanism shows $24.4M in forced sales against only $481.8k of exit liquidity, creating a ratio of 5054.9%. This imbalance means the token faces significant pressure through its recomputed exit-liquidity curves rather than remaining unaffected by the shock.

The depth curve at a 0.5% price impact holds $22.9M in total value, with $22.5M contributed by the stability module. At a 1.0% impact, the total remains $22.9M while the pool depth grows to $446.7k. By the time the curve reaches a 2.0% price impact, the total value is $23.0M and the pool depth sits at $481.8k.

Further along the curve, a 5.0% price impact shows a total of $23.0M with a pool depth of $513.9k. The stability module consistently contributes $22.5M across these levels. Two GSM venues enter the exit process: one holds a balance of $0.03 at a 0.0015 fee, and the other holds $22.5M at a 0.0010 fee.

The system allows minting through automated contracts with no delay and no veto, while debt ceilings are managed by the same automated entities without a pause window. Contract upgrades are immutable because no one holds that power, yet pausing is possible via a multisig or an automated contract depending on the specific module being halted.

Freezing assets, setting oracle parameters, and adjusting risk settings all rely on automated contracts that act instantly with no veto capability. Blacklisting addresses and seizing assets are powers held by no one, meaning those actions cannot occur under current configuration.

The notice GHO:9 fired on 2026-09-14 because a larger share of the discovered on-chain exchange liquidity sits in venues this report does not model than the rubric allows without a notice; the exit-liquidity figures cover the modelled venues only. The data show that $35.4M of all DEX liquidity discovered for the token, every venue exists, while $2.5M of off-venue curve mainnet liquidity is recorded. Of this total, 93.0% of discovered DEX liquidity lies outside modeled venues as of 2026-10-01.

On 2026-09-14, the system flagged that the frozen set of exit pools covers less liquidity than the archetype's target under a dated waiver. The freeze date is 2026-09-08, and the coverage shortfall applies only to the pools active on that date.