crvUSD

An automated structural risk report on crvUSD: every number below is read from Ethereum at block 26143168 and can be reproduced (see the verify page).

read 2026-10-07 21:22 UTC · block 26143168 · report 07f460c0 · intake sheet 29682310

Disclosures 0 days old on average · worst WBTC, 0 days old, 30.5% of backingRule changes: 1 to 7 day delay1 notice(s): gate failure

The finding ?

Notice: gate failure (entry crvUSD:17, first fired 2026-09-30)

No written summary for this section this run: the local model's draft did not pass the figure guard.

Supply ?

$2.1B

Bad debt, headline scenario ?

structurally zero

Exit liquidity, headline scenario ?

$25.7M

Where the backing sits ?

The DAO can change minting and oracle settings with a 1 to 7 day delay.

No written summary for this section this run: the local model's draft did not pass the figure guard.

What could break it ?

The headline scenario is a 50% fall in the price of volatile collateral, with no extra discount on liquid-staking tokens and liquidity providers staying put: the one scenario the archetype memo names as the headline (memo §6.2.6).

In that scenario liquidations leave $6 of bad debt (< 0.01% of supply), structurally zero on this grid because soft liquidation converts collateral at band prices before positions become insolvent, and require selling $6 into $25.7M of exit liquidity.

price fall	no LP flight	30% LP flight	60% LP flight
-20.0%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%	exit exhausted
-35.0%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%	exit exhausted
-50.0%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%	exit exhausted
-70.0%	< 0.1%	< 0.1%	exit exhausted

price fall

no LP flight

30% LP flight

60% LP flight

-20.0%

< 0.1%

exit exhausted

-35.0%

< 0.1%

exit exhausted

-50.0%

< 0.1%

exit exhausted

-70.0%

< 0.1%

exit exhausted

Each cell: collateral that must be sold ÷ liquidity available to absorb it; “exit exhausted” = no liquidity left at that level of liquidity-provider flight. ?
0 under 0.1% under 10% under 100% 100% or more exit exhausted

At a 50% fall, forced sales use < 0.01% of available exit liquidity; at a 70% fall, forced sales use < 0.01% of available exit liquidity; and if 60% of liquidity providers leave at a 70% fall, no exit liquidity is left.

Prices follow exponential moving averages of pool prices, so they lag the market by design; the window per market is in the oracle table.

Who can change the rules ?

Minting: the DAO, with a 1 to 7 day delay.
Debt ceilings: the DAO, with a 1 to 7 day delay; a veto holder can cancel the change.
Contract upgrades: no one holds this power.
Pausing: the DAO, with no delay.
Freezing assets: no one holds this power.
Blacklisting addresses: no one holds this power.
Oracle settings: the DAO, with a 1 to 7 day delay; a veto holder can cancel the change.
Risk parameters: the DAO, with a 1 to 7 day delay; a veto holder can cancel the change.
Seizing assets: no one holds this power.

How it trades ?

Peg price ?

0.9989

Deviation from peg ?

−11.4 bp

Webacy depeg score ?

1 of 100

tier ok

DEX liquidity ?

$150.3M

depth deep

Supply change, 7 days ?

−$1.6M

−0.7%

Top-10 holder share ?

0.0%

risk band low

7-day max |deviation|: 33.8 bp

Share of liquidity among the 10 Ethereum pools Webacy lists, $140.5M

Net supply change, per Webacy

Share of supply by holder group: not reported by Webacy this run.

DEX pools, top 10 by liquidity

#	DEX	pair	liquidity	24h volume	pool
1	Curve	crvUSD/USDT	$41.2M	$1.2M	`0x390f…7bf4`
2	Curve	crvUSD/WETH	$31.4M	$983.6k	`0x6563…b9f3`
3	Curve	crvUSD/cbBTC	$21.5M	$23	`0x83f2…eb32`
4	Curve	frxUSD/crvUSD	$17.1M	$164.4k	`0x13e1…43e1`
5	Curve	crvUSD/USDC	$13.3M	$747.6k	`0x4dec…d69e`
6	Curve	crvUSD/WBTC	$6.3M	$3.4k	`0xd9ff…8373`
7	Curve	crvUSD/tBTC/wstETH	$3.1M	$62.6k	`0x2889…3d13`
8	Curve	tBTC/crvUSD	$3.1M	$13.7k	`0x2889…3a88`
9	Curve	CRV/crvUSD	$1.8M	$453.9k	`0x4ebd…cd52`
10	Curve	crvUSD/WETH	$1.8M	$90.9k	`0x4ebd…6cc2`

Behavioral data: Webacy, fetched 2026-10-18 12:36 UTC. Fetched, not computed or verified by this pipeline.

How to check this ?

Every figure on this page comes from one data table built from on-chain reads at a single block. Reproduce any of them from the verify page. Verify page · report fingerprint 07f460c0eb45a1ca

The behavioral tier — how the token trades: peg deviation, liquidity, holder concentration and supply flows — is shown under "How it trades", from Webacy's data fetched at a timestamp rather than read at this report's block. This report is the structural tier only: what backs the token, how far that backing can be checked on-chain, and how it holds up under stress.

Detail for specialists

Collateral nodes whose backing depends on disclosures or stops at a truncation

disclosure-dependent node	last disclosure	share of backing
WBTC	2026-10-07	30.5%
cbBTC	2026-10-07	12.8%
LBTC	2026-10-07	< 0.1%

Supply, what was originated, and the residual with its named causes

figure	value
supply	2,104,809,204.98
originated supply	95,408,964.65
supply the tree covers	95,408,964.65
residual (supply − originated)	2,009,400,240.33
· non-mint-market minting facilitators enumerated from `SetDebtCeiling` history — the lend factories (zero ceilings, confirmed non-originating), the FlashLender, the FastBridgeVaults, and an unclassified minting factory (`0x370a449f…`, verified name Factory) pending perimeter re-ruling; amount = held + deployed (ceiling − held, floor 0) (17)	1,060,650,000.01
· mint-controller pre-mint inventory (9)	645,331,592.19
· PegKeeper undrawn inventory (5)	303,418,648.14
unexplained after named causes	-0.0092
stabilizer debt ÷ supply	1.0%
protocol stabilizer debt	20,581,351.86 (1.0% of supply)
ceiling aggregate: the upper bound of the protocol stabilizer slice	324,000,000.00 (15.4% of supply)

stabilizer operation	ceiling	utilization	net position value
`0x9201da…e340`	135,000,000.00	0	0
`0xfb726f…f9f3`	135,000,000.00	15.2%	10,035,540.33
`0x3fa20e…e09c`	45,000,000.00	0	0
`0x338cb2…1f9d`	9,000,000.00	0	0
`0x53876b…c50b`	0	—	0

Net position of each stabilizer operation: pro-cyclical, non-credited; valued at par.

non-mint-market minting facilitators enumerated from `SetDebtCeiling` history — the lend factories (zero ceilings, confirmed non-originating), the FlashLender, the FastBridgeVaults, and an unclassified minting factory (`0x370a449f…`, verified name Factory) pending perimeter re-ruling; amount = held + deployed (ceiling − held, floor 0)

address	amount
`0x0a05ff…97d3`	0
`0x0b502e…c820`	0
`0x1ef89e…ccae`	0
`0x26de78…9ee1`	30,000,000.01
`0x370a44…00c0`	1,000,000,000.00
`0x503e1b…91f8`	0
`0x5b49b9…a4c6`	0
`0x5ef620…b9ec`	150,000.00
`0x68e31e…21ca`	0
`0x6b765d…c345`	0
`0x97d024…e937`	200,000.00
`0xa7a4bb…299b`	0
`0xaa3467…ae22`	0
`0xadb10d…843d`	300,000.00
`0xd99391…afff`	30,000,000.00
`0xe7cd2b…c5c8`	0
`0xff7846…92bf`	0

mint-controller pre-mint inventory

address	amount
`0x100daa…c6ce`	120,081,161.68
`0x1c91da…e704`	44,018,932.71
`0x4e5954…5c67`	180,174,563.33
`0x652aea…6b11`	16,774,129.56
`0x8472a9…8e76`	4,917.12
`0x8aca5a…58ef`	0
`0xa920de…9635`	197,371,654.47
`0xec0820…15cf`	48,058,012.17
`0xf8c786…cbe3`	38,848,221.16

PegKeeper undrawn inventory

address	amount
`0x338cb2…1f9d`	9,000,000.00
`0x3fa20e…e09c`	45,000,000.00
`0x53876b…c50b`	0
`0x9201da…e340`	135,000,000.00
`0xfb726f…f9f3`	114,418,648.14

Every figure in the headline scenario

metric	value
collateral coverage before the shock	1.0376
collateral coverage after the shock	1.2271
coverage restored by the liquidation mechanism	0.1895
bad debt	6.28
bad debt as a share of supply	< 0.1%
collateral that must be sold	6.28
exit liquidity	25,651,705.25
forced sales ÷ exit liquidity	< 0.1%

Mechanism state in the headline scenario

quantity	value
alpha	0.5000
beta	0.2500
burn capacity	20,581,351.86
ceiling aggregate	324,000,000.00
the counterfactual lines printed with this scenario	H1_kill, EMA_lag
PegKeeper headroom that can actually be used	80,668,475.92
exit liquidity in this scenario	25,651,705.25
share of liquidity providers leaving in this scenario	0
PegKeeper headroom by debt ceilings alone	303,418,648.14
stabilizer debt post cell	20,581,351.86
utilization post cell	0.0635

PegKeepers

address	allowed	balance	ceiling	debt	killed (provide)	killed (withdraw)	max ratio	debt share
`0x338cb2…1f9d`	3,214,277.51	9,000,000.00	9,000,000.00	0	no	no	0.3571	0
`0x3fa20e…e09c`	16,071,387.57	45,000,000.00	45,000,000.00	0	no	no	0.3571	0
`0x53876b…c50b`	0	0	0	0	no	no	0.3571	0
`0x9201da…e340`	48,214,162.70	135,000,000.00	135,000,000.00	0	no	no	0.3571	0
`0xfb726f…f9f3`	13,168,648.14	114,418,648.14	135,000,000.00	20,581,351.86	no	no	0.2500	0.1525

Oracle vs pool spot price, per market

address	oracle spot gap
`0x100daa…c6ce`	0.0415
`0x1c91da…e704`	0.2351
`0x4e5954…5c67`	-0.0570
`0x652aea…6b11`	0.6693
`0x8472a9…8e76`	1.6904
`0x8aca5a…58ef`	0.2402
`0xa920de…9635`	-0.0149
`0xec0820…15cf`	0.3740
`0xf8c786…cbe3`	-0.0336

Paired stablecoin held by each PegKeeper

address	paired units held
`0x338cb2…1f9d`	0
`0x3fa20e…e09c`	0
`0x53876b…c50b`	0
`0x9201da…e340`	0
`0xfb726f…f9f3`	20,030,957.35

PegKeeper share of its pool

address	pegkeeper lp share
`0x338cb2…1f9d`	0
`0x3fa20e…e09c`	0
`0x53876b…c50b`	0
`0x9201da…e340`	0
`0xfb726f…f9f3`	0.6031

Pool balance after the shock

field	pool tilt post cell
`reason`	not applicable — M1
`value`	0

PegKeeper provide limit

address	provide allowed
`0x338cb2…1f9d`	0
`0x3fa20e…e09c`	0
`0x53876b…c50b`	0
`0x9201da…e340`	0
`0xfb726f…f9f3`	0

PegKeeper withdraw limit

address	withdraw allowed
`0x338cb2…1f9d`	115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,687,907,853,269,984,665,640,564,039,457.58
`0x3fa20e…e09c`	115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,687,907,853,269,984,665,640,564,039,457.58
`0x53876b…c50b`	115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,687,907,853,269,984,665,640,564,039,457.58
`0x9201da…e340`	115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,687,907,853,269,984,665,640,564,039,457.58
`0xfb726f…f9f3`	115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,687,907,853,269,984,665,640,564,039,457.58

What changes under the counterfactual assumptions

counterfactual	affects	as modelled	under the counterfactual
H1 kill	m2	6.28	6.28
EMA lag	m1.post	0	29,276,363.80

No written summary for this section this run: the local model's draft did not pass the figure guard.

Exit liquidity at four price-impact levels

Exit liquidity available if sellers accept up to 0.5%, 1%, 2% or 5% price impact; the report's headline uses 2%.

Depeg scenario target: 0xdac17f…1ec7 · every scenario in the appendix

Headline exit liquidity 25,651,705.25; LP capital assumed sticky.

LP-flight grid 0% / 30% / 60%: assumed scenario modifier, not data-derived.

modeled pools: the largest pools covering 90% of the frozen set, which itself covered 95% of discovered on-Curve liquidity at freeze time (2026-09-04). K-subset share of the frozen set: 95.9%

No written summary for this section this run: the local model's draft did not pass the figure guard.

A depeg of the paired stablecoin fits this token's mechanism because it is structurally insulated by construction, meaning its internal collateral ratio does not change during a shock. Instead, any impact flows through exit venues where liquidity providers may withdraw their assets. The recomputed exit-liquidity curves show that at a price impact of 5.0%, the available depth is $23.7M when the paired stablecoin trades at 0.93.

The system also holds $20.6M in burn capacity and maintains $80.7M of effective PegKeeper headroom that can actually be used to manage stress. These resources remain available even as the paired asset moves toward its depeg target of 0xdac17f…1ec7.

Liquidity providers staying put contribute to the depth curve, but their flight levels determine how quickly usable liquidity shrinks under pressure.

The modelling assumptions and the data behind each

assumption	what it means	data	source
`stock_only`	Capacity is measured as a stock at the run block; how each mechanism's stock-only reading errs is the bias table below.	bias: Collateral-sell-side bound: see appendix bias mechanism: see appendix bias tokens: crvUSD, GHO bias reason: see appendix … 32 more in table.json	memo §7.1
`observation`	Prices are taken as observed instantly at the run block; the oracle table lists each feed's update condition.	EMA window: 10,387 s EMA window: 2,597 s EMA window: 866 s EMA window: 866 s … 5 more in table.json	memo §7.2
`lp_sticky`	Liquidity providers are assumed to stay in their pools unless a scenario applies the liquidity-flight modifier.	LP-flight assumption line: see appendix	memo §6.1.4
`lp_grid`	Liquidity-provider flight is an assumed modifier of 0%, 30% and 60%, not a measured behaviour.	LP-flight assumption line: see appendix	memo §6.1.4
`sell_side_bound`	Collateral that liquidations must sell is bounded by the analyst's dated sell-side capacity per volatile collateral.	sell-side bound: sfrxETH: 10.25 sell-side bound: wstETH: 609.38 sell-side bound: WBTC: 131.25 sell-side bound: WETH: 13,750.00 … 4 more in table.json	memo §6.3
`par_numeraire`	paired assets counted at 1.00 for depth	—	memo §6.1.3
`shock_grid_fixed`	The shock grid is fixed by the archetype memo, not tuned per token.	—	memo §6.2.1
`lst_discount_grid`	Liquid-staking tokens take an additional discount of 0%, 5% or 10%.	—	memo §6.2.2
`member2_target`	The depeg scenario targets the paired stablecoin named in the frozen pool set.	Member-2 target: 0xdac17f…1ec7	memo §6.2.5
`freeze_reference`	Exit venues are the pool set frozen on the freeze date shown.	freeze date: 2026-09-04	memo §5.7
`band_linear`	An additional modelling disclosure carried by the stress model; its full text is in the appendix.	assumption: band linear: see appendix	—
`capacity`	An additional modelling disclosure carried by the stress model; its full text is in the appendix.	assumption: capacity: see appendix	—
`ema_lag_readings`	The oracle's smoothed price lags the market; this line recomputes collateral coverage after the shock as if that lagged price were the one in use, beside the primary result.	assumption: ema lag readings: see appendix	—
`lp_flight`	Liquidity providers' capital is assumed to stay in the exit pools in the headline cell; other cells of the grid show what happens when part of the paired asset is withdrawn.	assumption: lp flight: see appendix	—
`structural_insulation`	A depeg of the paired stablecoin forces no collateral sales for this token by construction, so the ratio is zero; the exposure runs through exit venues and is shown as recomputed depth curves.	assumption: structural insulation: see appendix	—
`undefined_ratio`	Where the exit pool holds no depth at all, the forced-sales ratio has no value and the cell is marked rather than computed.	assumption: undefined ratio: see appendix	—

How a stock-only reading errs, mechanism by mechanism

stock-only capacity — direction of error per mechanism

mechanism	tokens	direction	reason
Collateral-sell-side bound	crvUSD, GHO	overstates	full bound treated as immediately absorbable
GSM cap headroom (H2.i)	GHO	overstates	full cap headroom treated as instantly mintable
Liquidator recycling (H5)	GHO	understates	no multi-round capital recycling
Stability Pool refills (H3)	LUSD	understates	no SP deposits between liquidation waves
PegKeeper effective headroom (H1)	crvUSD	overstates	full effective headroom treated as deployed within the window; peer co-deployment dynamics omitted — runs conservative
H4 redemption capacity	LUSD	overstates	full schedule capacity treated as immediately available; base-rate decay (regenerative, 12h half-life) omitted — runs conservative
H5 liquidator appetite (composite)	GHO	both	two named opposite-sign terms; `binding_side` states per cell which dominates
Pool exit depth — no LP inflow	all	understates	no LP inflow modeled
Pool exit depth — LP sticky at flight-0	all	overstates	static composition; spread disclosed by the LP-flight grid

The admin-power table, row by row

The DAO holds the power to mint new tokens, adjust debt ceilings, and change oracle settings. Each of these changes takes between one and seven days to apply, and the emergency admin address can veto them.

No one holds the power to upgrade the contract, freeze assets, blacklist addresses, or seize funds. The contract is immutable by design, meaning its core rules cannot be altered once deployed.

power	holder	type	delay	veto	upgradeable	scope	evidence
minting	`0xb7400d…fb79`	the DAO	1–7 days	—	—	`0xc9332f…38bc` `0x36a04c…855f`	contract read: admin()
debt ceilings	`0xb7400d…fb79`	the DAO	1–7 days	0x467947…1e0c	—	`0xc9332f…38bc` `0x36a04c…855f`	contract read: admin()
contract upgrades	`—`	none	none	—	immutable		absence read
pausing	`0x467947…1e0c`	the DAO	none	—	—	`0x36a04c…855f`	contract read: emergency_admin()
freezing assets	`—`	none	none	—	—		absence read
blacklisting addresses	`—`	none	none	—	—		absence read
oracle settings	`0xb7400d…fb79`	the DAO	1–7 days	0x467947…1e0c	—	`0xc9332f…38bc` `0x36a04c…855f`	contract read: admin()
risk parameters	`0xb7400d…fb79`	the DAO	1–7 days	0x467947…1e0c	—	`0xc9332f…38bc` `0x36a04c…855f`	contract read: admin()
seizing assets	`—`	none	none	—	—		absence read

Price feeds: type, update threshold and heartbeat

collateral	market or reserve	update rule	threshold	window / heartbeat	staleness
sfrxETH	`0x8472a9…8e76`	ema window	—	10,387 s	not assessed in this pilot
wstETH	`0x100daa…c6ce`	ema window	—	2,597 s	not assessed in this pilot
WBTC	`0x4e5954…5c67`	ema window	—	866 s	not assessed in this pilot
WETH	`0xa920de…9635`	ema window	—	866 s	not assessed in this pilot
sfrxETH	`0xec0820…15cf`	ema window	—	2,597 s	not assessed in this pilot
tBTC	`0x1c91da…e704`	ema window	—	601 s	not assessed in this pilot
weETH	`0x652aea…6b11`	ema window	—	866 s	not assessed in this pilot
cbBTC	`0xf8c786…cbe3`	ema window	—	866 s	not assessed in this pilot
LBTC	`0x8aca5a…58ef`	ema window	—	866 s	not assessed in this pilot

Independent market reference prices are not available from a pinned source in this pilot (9 collaterals).

instant observation — knowingly optimistic: LLAMMA prices off an EMA oracle; see counterfactual line EMA_lag

oracle manipulation out of scope — feed control reported under the admin-power surface (the oracle settings rows of the admin-power table). oracle failure/staleness out of scope. sequencer/infra risk n/a — mainnet only.

No notices are open for this token this run.

Audits, bug bounty and counterparties

MixBytes 2023-06-05: crvUSD infrastructure
ChainSecurity 2024-01-24: crvUSD infrastructure
ChainSecurity 2025-02-21: crvUSD infrastructure
ChainSecurity 2023-12-12: PegKeeperV2
ChainSecurity 2024-10-25: FastBridge (cross-chain crvUSD)
MixBytes 2024-09-02: LlamaLend

Audit list (analyst-supplied 2026-09-13)

Bug bounty: Curve (self-run, docs.curve.finance/developer/security), max USD 250,000 (analyst-supplied 2026-09-13). Last material change audited: yes (analyst-supplied 2026-09-13). Audit status as of 2026-09-13. Counterparties: n/a — archetype #1 holds no off-chain counterparties. WBTC custodian captured in §4 look-through.

The finding ?The three figures that summarise this report, read at block 26143168; the written summary arrives with the prose stage.

Where the backing sits ?The collateral behind crvUSD, across the crvUSD mint markets in scope, split by how far its value can be checked on-chain, at block 26143168.

What could break it ?The headline stress scenario and the grid around it: collateral price falls of 20–70% with liquidity-provider flight of 0–60%, across the crvUSD mint markets in scope, at block 26143168.

Who can change the rules ?Who holds each administrative power over the protocol's contracts and how long a change takes to take effect, read at block 26143168.

How it trades ?Webacy's view of how this token trades, fetched at the time shown under the chart; not read at this report's block and not verified by this pipeline.

How to check this ?Every figure is pinned to block 26143168; the verify page lists the calls that reproduce them.

Detail for specialists

Mechanism state in the headline scenario

PegKeepers

Oracle vs pool spot price, per market

Paired stablecoin held by each PegKeeper

PegKeeper share of its pool

Pool balance after the shock

PegKeeper provide limit

PegKeeper withdraw limit

stock-only capacity — direction of error per mechanism

The finding ?

Where the backing sits ?

What could break it ?

Who can change the rules ?

How it trades ?

How to check this ?